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NASA Risk and Safety Culture
• Understanding Risk Tolerance
– Working with Imperfect Humans
– Learning How to Identify “Smart Risks”
– Risk Management Processes
• NASA’s Safety Culture 
– Reducing Error by Cultivating Skill-Based Behavior
– Bolstering Trust Throughout Operations
– Looking at Catastrophic Events Through the Safety Culture Lens
– Comparing Safety Culture Objectives
• Exercise – Risk Mitigation Planning
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3“It can only be attributable to human error.“
-- HAL 9000 (2001: A Space Odyssey)
Words of Wisdom
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What is the impact of Human Factors?
• Estimates range from 65-90% of catastrophic mishaps are due 
to human error.
– NASA’s human factors-related mishaps causes are estimated at ~75%
• As much as we’d like to error-proof our work environment, 
even the most automated and complex technical endeavors 
require human interaction…and are vulnerable to human 
frailty.
• Industry and government are focusing not only on human 
factors integration into hazardous work environments, but 
also looking for practical approaches to cultivating a strong 
Safety Culture that diminishes risk.   
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Some Risk Management Philosophy…
As much as we’d like to be able to predict error, the reality is that we must 
measure known performance characteristics to identify vulnerabilities, 
mitigate greatest risk, and enable prudent response to the next accident.
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High Risk Occupations vs. Space Flight
Shuttle Astronaut
Northeast Multispecies 
Groundfish Fishing
Alaskan Commercial Fishing
Commercial Fishing
Extraction –
Mining, Oil and Gas
Construction Worker
Alaskan Commuter Pilot
Airline Pilot
Timber Cutting and Logging
Truck Driver
0 1:100 1:50 1:33
Probability
1:218
1:166
1:775
1:851
1:4420
1:4190
1:336
1:1270
1:998
1:3790
Person-Fatality Risk Per Year 
Risk increases as “drill down” into smaller and 
smaller groups that drive the risk.  
Shuttle Astronaut risk is a very small group that 
has high risk.
Miner risk does not include fatalities due to chronic 
illnesses like “black lung.” 
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1:70Mt. Everest Climber
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Risk Tolerance & Failing Smart
NASA is known for Gene Kranz’s
famous quote,
“Failure is not an option.”  
It is not an option anyone 
chooses, but it is a reality we 
must confront.
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How to identify a smart risk….
• Can we afford the consequence of failure?  
• Can we learn from the mistake?  
• Can we get back up and try again? 
• Do we own the risk in the first place? 
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JSC RISK MATRIX
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High – Mitigate; implement new 
processes, change requirements, 
or re-baseline
Moderate – Manage/consider 
alternative processes, or Accept
Low – Manage within normal 
processes; or Close
SEVERITY
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Very 
Likely
Likely
Unlikely
Possible
Highly 
Unlikely
Expected to happen.  Controls have minimal to no effect.
Likely to happen.  Controls have significant limitations or 
uncertainties.
Could happen.  Controls exist, with some limitations or 
uncertainties.
Not expected to happen.  Controls have minor limitations 
or uncertainties.
Extremely remote possibility that it will happen. Strong 
controls in place.
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CONSEQUENCE Subcategories 1 2 3 4 5
Personnel
Minor injury;                           
Minor OSHA violation
Short-term injury; Moderate 
OSHA violation
Long-term injury, impairment 
or incapacitation;           
Signif icant OSHA violation
Permanent injury or 
incapacitation;                             
Major OSHA violation
Loss of life
System, Facility Minor damage to asset
Moderate impact or 
degraded performance
Loss of non-critical asset Damage to a critical asset
Loss of critical asset or 
emergency evacuation
Environment
Minor or non-reportable 
hazard or incident
Moderate hazard or 
reportable violation
Signif icant violation; Event 
requires immediate 
remediation
Major violation; Event causes 
temporary w ork stoppage
Catastrophic hazard
TECHNICAL Performance
Minor impact to mission 
objectives or 
requirements
Incomplete compliance w ith 
a key mission objective
Noncompliance; Signif icant 
impact to mission
Noncompliance; Major impact 
on Center or Spaceflight 
mission
Failure to meet mission 
objectives
Infrastructure
Minor impact or reduced 
effectiveness 
Moderate impact or damage 
to infrastructure
Signif icant damage to 
infrastructure or reduced 
support
Mission delays or major 
impacts to Center operations
Extended loss of critical 
capabilities
Workforce
Minor impact to human 
capital
Moderate impact to human 
capital
Signif icant impact; Loss of 
critical skill
Major impact; Loss of skill set Loss of Core Competency
COST
Organizational or 
CMO Impact
<2% Budget increase or 
<$1M CMO Threat
2-5% Budget increase or   
$1M-$5M CMO Threat
5-10% Budget increase or   
$5M-10M CMO Threat
10-15% Budget increase or 
$10M-$60M CMO Threat
>15% Budget increase or 
>$60M CMO Threat; 
SCHEDULE -- Minor milestone slip
Moderate milestone slip; 
Schedule margin available
Project milestone slip; No 
impact to a critical path
Major milestone slip; Impact to 
a critical path
Failure to meet critical 
milestones
HSE                              
(Health, Safety, 
Environment)
CENTER 
CAPABILITIES
NASA’s Risk Scorecard
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Institutional Risk Management
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3 x 4 p Test system maintenance ## 3 2 2 4 4 2
4 x 5 p Mission essential resource limitations ## 4 4 5 2 1 4
4 x 3 p Equipment End-of-Life ## 4 3 1 1 3
4 x 3 p Building Refurbishments ## 4 3 3 1 1 2
5 x 5 p Comm Systems End-of-Life ## 5 5 4 3 5 5
4 x 4 p Building Maintenance Shortfall ## 4 3 3 4 2 2
3 x 4 p Asbestos abatement ## 3 2 3 2 4 3
4 x 4 p Core Capability Threat ## 4 4 3 1 4
4 x 4 p Water System-Repairs/Upgrades ## 4 4 4 4 2 3
5 x 4 r Research equipment failure threat ## 5 4 4 4
Legend
p Top Center Risk (TCR)
r Proposed Top Center Risk (Proposed TCR)
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• Risk management forums are active for individual programs and the 
institution, but risk assessment criteria is consistent.  
• Though program and institutional operating budgets are separate, risks are 
cross-communicated to identify potential impacts.
David T. Loyd
Process Measures for High-Risk Facilities
• Industry and government organizations have recognized the value of monitoring leading indicators 
to identify potential risk vulnerabilities.
• NASA has adapted this approach to assess risk controls associated with hazardous, critical, and 
complex facilities.
• NASA’s facility risk assessments integrate commercial loss control, OSHA Process Safety, API 
Performance Indicator Standard, and NASA Operational Readiness Inspection concepts to identify 
risk control vulnerabilities. 
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Examples of leading 
measure areas for high-risk 
facilities include:
 Maintenance and system 
integrity conditions;
 Operational qualifications;
 Challenges to safety systems 
and monitoring equipment;
 Communication and reporting 
system conditions;
 Accuracy of configuration 
management;
 Maintenance of operational 
procedures and emergency 
response plans. 
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Not 
Applicable
Elements of 
assessment are 
not applicable to 
the associated 
facility mission.
HATS Closed:
Conforms
Items identified as 
nonconforming 
were resolved.
* Non-
conformance
Documentation 
does not exist to 
support the 
checklist 
requirements.  
Partially 
conforms
Significant 
information is 
available, but 
does not meet the 
intent of risk 
control, or it is out 
of date or 
unavailable.  
Conforms
Documentation is 
available with the 
required 
information to 
meet checklist 
intent.
Ellington
Field
Mission
Operations
Engineering CODIRD
Assessment 
Characteristic Key
SA KA
OA
NS
Building/Facility identifications
Facility Safety Risk Monitoring
Assessment Characteristic Status
* A nonconformance is tracked until closure.  
Partial nonconformances represent opportunities 
for risk reduction but are not followed up until 
the next scheduled assessment. 
Minimizing Human Error 
and Cultivating a Reduced Risk Environment 
Rasmussen’s 3 Human Responses to Operator Information Processing 
1. Skill-based: requires little or no cognitive effort.
2. Rule-based: driven by procedures or rules.
3. Knowledge-based: requires problem solving/decision making.
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“The fewer rules a coach has, the fewer 
rules there are for players to break.”
John Madden 
“Successful design is not the 
achievement of perfection but the 
minimization and accommodation of 
imperfection.” 
Henry Petroski
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Trust is what drives open reporting and 
dialog to assure the most information 
is available to inform successful 
decision-making. 
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Trust is the foundation of an effective Safety Culture
November 8, 2016 David T. Loyd
How Safety Culture Promotes Operational Excellence
• By advocating a pervasive Safety Culture, we can 
provide our workforce with:
– Clear emphasis on continuous learning.
– Encouragement to develop intuitive personal values.
– Guidelines for decision-making behavior that focuses on 
long-term success.
– Reinforcement to build trust by reporting and 
communicating concerns and ideas.
• Practicing an effective Safety Culture: 
– Builds Skill-based and Knowledge-based response 
mechanisms,
– Reduces dependence on Rule-based response, 
– And breaks down barriers to Trust. 
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The NASA Safety Culture
• Space-related tragedies have marked 
our safety culture evolution.
• It’s not possible to perpetuate a safety 
culture in space without taking care of 
each other on the ground and at home.
“I believe that this nation should commit itself to 
achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of 
landing a man on the moon and returning him safely 
to the earth.” 
– John F. Kennedy address to Congress, May 25, 
1962
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NASA’s Safety/Risk Culture Model
16
“An environment characterized by safe attitudes and 
behaviors modeled by leaders and embraced by all that 
fosters an atmosphere of open communication, mutual 
trust, shared safety values and lessons, and confidence 
that we will balance challenges and risks consistent with 
our core value of safety to successfully accomplish our 
mission.”
An effective safety culture is characterized by the following 
subcomponents:
Culture - We report our concerns
Culture - We have a sense of fairness
Culture - We change to meet new demands
Culture - We learn from our successes and mistakes
Culture - Everyone does his or her part 
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Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA’s History
Reporting – With both tragedies, launch process deficiencies, such as O-ring 
susceptibility in cold temperatures (Challenger) and foam shedding (Columbia), 
were passively reported problems, yet were not considered serious hazards.
Just – Some engineers were reluctant to raise concerns when faced with a return of 
an “in God we trust - all others bring data” attitude.  
Flexible – With both incidents, the Shuttle Program was experiencing schedule 
pressure challenges. 
Learning – With “normalization of deviance,” O-ring burn-through and foam impact 
had become classified as “in-family” and as a negligible risk.
Engaged – NASA management lacked involvement in critical discussions. 
March 12, 2018
Columbia – February 1, 2003
Challenger – January 28, 1986
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Deepwater Horizon – April 20, 2010
Reporting – Procedures were subjected to last-minute 
distribution, last minute decision.
Just – Concerns of rig workers regarding test results 
were muted, not heeded or explored .
Flexible – All involved seemed prepared to exercise 
flexibility, but this may be indicative of insufficient 
process discipline.
Learning – Invalid confidence in new slurry, vents from 
Mud-Gas Separator (MGS) allowed gas to enter rig 
spaces, insufficient planning for contingencies.
Engaged – Incorrect reading of pressure tests, lack of 
recognition or timely control action related to kicks, 
diverted flow through MGS instead of overboard,  
reluctance to activate Blow-Out Preventer (BOP), 
reluctance to activate the Emergency Disconnect 
System, BOP testing and maintenance.
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NASA Safety Culture Model Applied to Deepwater Horizon
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Safety Culture – Comparing Oil & Gas with NASA
NASA’s Safety Culture BSEE’s Nine Characteristics of a Strong Safety Culture
Reporting Culture – We report our 
concerns.
Hazard identification and risk management
Effective Safety and Environmental Communication
Environment for raising concerns
Just Culture – We have a sense of fairness. Respectful work environment
Flexible Culture – We change to meet new 
demands.
Work processes
Learning Culture – We learn from our 
successes and mistakes.
Continuous improvement
Inquiring attitude
Engaged Culture – Everyone does his or her 
part.
Personal accountability
Leadership commitment to safety values and actions
• In 2013, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) released policy on 
Safety Culture emphasized for adoption across the Oil and Gas industry.
• The “Nine Characteristics of a Strong Safety Culture” are closely aligned with Safety 
Culture attributes adopted by NASA.
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
(BSEE) Nine Characteristics of a Strong Safety Culture
1. Leadership commitment to safety values and actions: leaders demonstrate a commitment to 
safety and environmental stewardship in their decisions and behaviors. leaders visibly demonstrate this 
commitment through how they allocate resources within the organization and prioritize safety relative to 
production
2. Respectful work environment: trust and respect permeate the organization, with a focus on teamwork 
and collaboration
3. Environment for raising concerns: a work environment is maintained in which personnel feel free to 
raise safety and environmental concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or discrimination
4. Effective safety and environmental communication: communications maintain a focus on safety 
and environmental stewardship; knowledge and experience are shared throughout the organization.
5. Personal accountability: all individuals take personal responsibility for process and personal safety, as well 
as environmental stewardship
6. Inquiring attitude: individuals avoid complacency and continuously consider and review existing conditions 
and activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate action; workers are 
expected to question work practices as part of everyday conversations without hesitation
7. Hazard identification and risk management: issues potentially impacting safety and environmental 
stewardship are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed or corrected commensurate with 
their significance
8. Work processes: the process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented in a manner that 
maintains safety and environmental stewardship while ensuring use of the correct equipment, used in the correct 
way, for the correct work
9. Continuous improvement: opportunities to learn about ways to ensure safety and environmental 
stewardship are sought out and implemented |20
Reducing Risk Vulnerabilities
• NASA, like the other hazardous industries, 
has suffered very catastrophic losses.
• Human error will likely never be completely 
eliminated as a factor in our failures.
• Acknowledging human frailty and the 
potential for failure bolsters our ability to 
manage risks and mitigate the worst 
consequences.
• Building an effective Safety Culture bolsters 
skill-based performance that minimizes risk 
and encourages operational excellence. 
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Exercise – Risk Mitigation Planning
NASA Johnson Space Center
HOUSTON, TEXAS
Risk Mitigation Strategies
For each of the following workplace pictures:
1. Identify at least one risk using any method you choose.
2. Determine potential severity the risk represents and the associated 
probability of occurrence.
3. Identify what parties share in the risk and should be consulted in 
managing it.
4. Identify necessary action to eliminate the risk.
5. Prepare a mitigation plan for reducing potential risk impact addressing 
either severity reduction or probability reduction.
6. Identify under what circumstance the risk could be accepted “as is”.
What would a strong safety cultural look like in this workplace?
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Risk to Oil & Gas Roughnecks
Risk Mitigation Strategies
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Risk 
Statement
Pre-control 
Risk Level
Risk 
Owner(s)
Control
(Elimination)
Mitigation Plan Acceptable
Risk?
Probability Severity
Mechanical 
Impact – struck 
by rigging 
equipment.
Moderate High • Worker
• Family
• Company/ 
Employer
• Regulation
Automation • Training
• JHA
• Procedures
• Supervision
• PPE
Not without 
mitigation.
Motor Vehicle 
accidents.
Moderate High • Worker
• Family
• Company/ 
Employer
• Public
• Regulation
Automated 
driving
Teleportation?
• Driver licensing
• Seat belts
• Defensive driver 
training
• Remote monitoring 
and enforcement
Yes – with 
regulation 
penalties and 
claims costs.
Hazardous 
material 
exposure.
Moderate Moderate • Worker
• Family
• Company/ 
Employer
• Regulation
• Gas monitoring
• JHA
• Supervision
• Respiratory 
Protection
Not without 
mitigation.
Risk to Oil & Gas Roughnecks
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Risk to Astronaut Extravehicular Activity
Risk Mitigation Strategies
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Risk 
Statement
Pre-control 
Risk Level
Risk 
Owner(s)
Control
(Elimination)
Mitigation 
Plan
Acceptable
Risk?
Probability Severity
Micrometeoroid/
Orbital Debris 
Impact
Low HIgh • Crew
• Family
• NASA
• Foreign Partner
• American Public
• Robotic EVA
• “Hard” suit 
design
• Prohibit EVA 
• Vehicle 
orientation for 
passive 
shielding
• Emergency
ingress
Yes – with 
passive 
shielding 
considerations.
External Sharp 
Edge EMU 
Tear/Damage
Moderate High • Crew
• Family
• NASA
• Foreign Partner
• American Public
• Robotic EVA
• Prohibit EVA 
• Crew training
• Emergency 
ingress
Yes
Water Intrusion 
or internal suit 
failure
Low High • Crew
• Family
• NASA
• EMU 
Manufacturer
• Foreign Partner
• American Public
• Robotic EVA
• Prohibit EVA
• EMU PMs and 
contamination 
control 
• Emergency 
ingress
Not without 
mitigation.
Risk to Astronaut Extravehicular Activity
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Risk to Bar and Restaurant Operations
Risk Mitigation Strategies
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Risk 
Statement
Pre-control 
Risk Level
Risk 
Owner(s)
Control
(Elimination)
Mitigation 
Plan
Acceptable
Risk?
Probability Severity
Workplace 
Violence
Low HIgh • Worker
• Customers
• Family
• Employer
• Protective 
Services
• Forced 
lobotomies.
• Surveillance
• Security
• Employee
training
• Police 
notification
Yes – only if the 
employer had not 
been aware of 
the potential for 
violence in the 
workplace.
Alcohol/Drug 
Abuse
Moderate Moderate • Worker
• Customers
• Family
• Employer
• Protective 
Services
• Prohibit 
alcohol sales.
• Alcohol
licensure
• Surveillance
• Employee 
training
• Police 
notification
Not without 
mitigation.
Foodborne illness Moderate Low • Worker
• Customers
• Family
• Employer
• Food supplier
• Limit/prohibit 
food 
availability.
• Municipal 
inspection
• Sanitation 
protocols
• Employee 
training
Not without 
mitigation.
Risk to Bar and Restaurant Operations
